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LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF SPECIAL DISTRICT
CORPORATE FORMs IN COLORADO
By

BENJAMIN NOVAK*

As various problems and concerns of municipalities and counties have crossed legal boundary lines, formation of 'especial distrists" by legislative enactment has become common. In a metropolitan area composed of several counties, sewage disposal, water
drainage, fire protection, recreationand others are common concerns
to which a special district governing body can better coordinate the
common efforts. In this article, Mr. Novak considers the definitional problems of special districts as related to their powers and
legal characteristics. The author limits himself to consideration of
Colorado special districts and classifies them into various categories.
INTRODUCTION

F

IFTY years ago, all special districts were thought to be essentially
alike in legal nature, and differences among them relating to
their functions or powers were considered only incidental.' This has
2
been the generally prevalent view of special districts since that time.
Recently, however, writers on the subject have adverted to the need
for a deeper analysis of the legal nature of special districts. Max
Pock, in an excellent study, noted that special districts operate in a
"definitional no man's land. ' 3 Referring to the practical problems
of special district litigation, one lawyer complained that "[tQhe
problem of classifying districts by powers or legal characteristics has
never been comprehensively attacked . .."' It is precisely this problem of classification which this article attempts to clarify.
Study of the special district enabling legislation and cases on
special districts in Colorado reveals significant differences among
several classes of special districts. For example, one class is deemed
*Economist, Resource Institutions Branch, Natural Resource Economics Division, Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture.
'"[O]ne fact now stands forth clearly: namely, that all these districts for special purposes are one in essential (legal] nature, regardless of the divergence of many of the
individual districts from the standard type." Guild, Special Municipal Corporations,
12 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 678, 679 (1918).
2 See, e.g., ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS, THE PROB-

LEM OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1964); J. BANKS, COLORADO LAW OF CITIES AND COUNTIES § 1.6 (1959); GOVERNOR'S LOCAL AFFAIRS
STUDY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT: LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN COLORADO 45 (1966)

;

Guild, supra note 1, and 18 NAT'L MUN. REV. 319 (1929); Tobin, The Legal and
Governmental Status of the Metropolitan Special District, 13 U. MIAMI L. REV. 129

(1958).

3 M. POCK, INDEPENDENT SPECIAL DISTRICTS: A SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN

AREA PROBLEMS 22 (1962).

4Perry, The Lawyer and Special Districts, 35 J. ST. B. CALIF. 21, 23 (1960).
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to be so essentially private and nongovernmental in purpose and
benefit that, without special statutory exemption, it is subjected to
normal taxation by the state, counties, and other units of local government. This class includes, among others, irrigation' and drainage
districts.' One group of districts has the power to levy general ad
valorem taxes, while another group can levy only special benefit
assessment taxes. Some of these differences, such as tax liability,
have been judicially decided. 7 Others, such as taxing powers, are
legislatively granted or withheld in the enabling statutes under which
these districts are formed.
The thesis of this article is that these differences, and others like
them, are neither random nor ad hoc. Rather, differences in purposes,
organization, powers, and limitations indicate differences in corporate
and governmental structure which can be classified so as to bring
order to this confusing area of statutory law. Essentially, three major
classes of districts can be distinguished, into which fall most of
Colorado's special districts. A few kinds of districts are hard to
definitively classify in one group or the other, and these will be
noted. Two of the major classes will be discussed in this article and
the reasons for their classification discussed in detail.
The discussion which follows will be limited to special districts
in Colorado. Furthermore, it will not discuss school districts which,
because of differences in character, function and purposes, lie beyond
the scope of this article and warrant full and separate treatment elsewhere. Finally, this classification of special districts according to
their legal and corporate characteristics is limited to those districts
which possess an independent corporate existence, and separate organization, range of action and responsibility. 8 For this reason,
districts such as disposal districts are not considered here as special
5

Organized under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 150-1-1 to -60, 150-2-1 to -40, and
150-3-1 to -88 '(1963). (A number of the Colorado Statutes cited in this article have
been amended, as indicated in the 1965 and 1967 Supplements to Colorado Revised
Statutes Annotated, 1963. However, the amendments do not alter or affect the
author's discussion and have not been indicated.)
6
Organized under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-1-1 to -10-2 (1963). Drainage districts are, however, exempt from taxation by statutory provision. Coio. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 47-2-7 (1963).
7See, e.g., Logan Irrigation Dist. v. Holt, 110 Colo. 253, 133 P.2d 530 (1943).
8
The criterion developed for inclusion in the 1962 Census of Governments was
whether the district under consideration "is an organized entity which, in addition to
having governmental character, has sufficient discretion in the management of its
own affairs to distinguish it as separate from the administrative structure of any
other administrative unit." U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: 1962, VOL. I, GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 15. The definition used in
this article is meant to be more exclusive than the Census Bureau criteria, requiring
not only administrative freedom in the management of its own affairs, but a thoroughly separate corporate existence from any other state or local governmental body.
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districts because they constitute little more than a department of
county government. For the same reason, districts formed under the
chapter on Public Recreation and Playgrounds are excluded as being
no more than administrative divisions of the town, city, county, or
school district by which they may be formed." ° Other districts which
will not be discussed in detail are mentioned and distinguished below
as special taxing districts.
The plan of this article is to present, in section I, a brief description of each class or type of special districts and its distinguishing
characteristics, and to list those specific districts, such as sanitation
and drainage, which fall into each class or type. This will be followed
in sections II and III by a detailed legal analysis of the two major
classes of districts under the headings of "Public Corporations," and
"Quasi-Municipal Corporations." Each of these will be discussed
separately and in depth according to its corporate nature and status
as it has been recognized by the courts; and distinguished from private, municipal, and other types of corporations, and from each other,
according to their characteristic legal powers and limitations.
I.

CLASSIFICATION OF DISTRICTS

There are several different criteria by which special districts
can be classified. Usually this is done on a functional, operat-ional,
or even geographical basis, such as, for example, distinguishing
between urban and predominantly rural districts. Each set of criteria
has its own particular merits and purposes, and it is not the function
of this article to analyze, criticize, or displace any other classification
system. This article is concerned with only one set of criteria: the
classification of districts by legal power characteristics. The classificatory terms used in this article, and the meanings accorded them, are
those employed by the courts in decided cases.
Colorado has 29 enabling statutes under which districts can be
formed. These can be divided into three main groups based upon
their purposes, types of taxing and other public powers, tax liability,
the degree of public or private interest involved in their functions,
and their independent corporate existence and status.
In classifying special districts, two sets of terms have been used
by the courts. The first is based upon the characteristic function of
the districts. Under this classification special districts can be classified
as local improvement districts, special service districts, and special
9
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 89-11-1 to -5 (1963).
0
' Id. §§ 114-1-1 to -2-5.
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taxing districts." The second classification is based upon the status
of the corporate entity involved in each type of district, and includes,
respectively, public corporations, quasi-municipal corporations, and
quasi-corporations whose corporate identity is indissolubly linked to
that of the city, county, or agency of the state by which it was created." The following is a brief outline of the distinguishing characteristics of each class of districts, and a listing of those districts
which would appear to belong to each class, determined by their
treatment in the courts, or by their essential statutory similarities.
11The

Governor's Local Affairs Commission, in its report on special district government in Colorado, distinguished only two types of districts - special service districts
and local improvement districts. See GOVERNOR'S LOCAL AFFAIRS STUDY COMMLSSION, supra note 2. The difference between their classification and this one is the
breakdown on their special service districts classification into two distinct types which
shall be dealt with here as special service districts and local improvement districts.
What the Commission discussed as local improvement districts will be discussed here
as special taxing districts.
The recently created State Division of Local Government has developed a more
complex and operationally oriented classification system in which four types of districts are distinguished. These are (1) single purpose districts; (2) multipurpose
districts; (3) local improvement districts; and (4) special taxing districts. Letter
from J.D. Arehart, Director, Division of Local Government, State of Colorado, to
Benjamin Novak, June 22, 1967. It is difficult, if not impossible, to correlate an
operational, functional, or other classification scheme with a legal one. First, from a
legal point of view, whether a district is authorized to provide for two functions,
such as, for example, sanitation and fire protection, or only one of these, is normally
immaterial. In a legal context, it is the powers given to the district to perform its
activities, and not the number of activities, that determine a district's classification.
The problem of reconciling this terminology to the courtroom is relatively easy,
for single and multipurpose mean the same things in the courtroom and out. However, a real problem arises where different groups develop classifications using the
same terms, but with different meanings. The Division of Local Government's last
two categories present a problem on this score. For example, the terms local improvement districts and special taxing districts do not mean the same things in the courtroom as they do in the public administrator's office, The Division of Local Government distinguishes between a local improvement district and a special taxing district
on the basis of whether, respectively, a single improvement is to be built by a municipality and paid for by special assessment of the benefited landowners, with operation
and maintenance costs appropriated from the city's general fund, or whether a service
is to be provided by a city or county to the residents of a defined area within the
city's or county's jurisdiction to be paid for on a continuous basis by ad valorem
taxes. Id. The first of these, local improvement disticts, are legally special taxing
districts, i.e., quasi-corporate entities through which funds are raised to finance construction of the improvement. The second, which the Division calls a special taxing
district, is not an independent district entity, but merely an authorization to the city
or county to provide a service to those parts of its jurisdiction in which the landowners are willing and able to pay for it. On the other hand, the courts have generally used the term local improvement district to denote an independent corporate
entity formed by landowners to construct, maintain, and operate an improvement, not
as a part or function of any other local or state governmental unit, but merely as a
group of landowners incorporated for their own, predominantly private, benefit.
These differences in terminology can create confusion. This is unfortunate, but
should not be new to the lawyer. In this article, the terms local improvement district
and special taxing district will be used in the manner in which they have been used
by the courts. It is suggested that this terminology be retained and used more consistently by lawyers and the courts, regardless of the value of other classification
schemes in other contexts.
12 All special districts in this class were said by the Governor's Local Affairs Study
Commission to be quasi-municipal corporations. GOVERNOR'S LOCAL AFFAIRS STUDY
COMMISSiON, supra note 2.
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A. Local Improvement Districts:Public Corporations
Local improvement districts are formed by landowners to construct, maintain, and operate improvements which affect the value of
the lands included within the district. They are full corporations,
independent from outside control except where they are regulated by
the legislature.
Local improvement districts are formed under general enabling
laws, usually by a petition to the district court or to the board of
county commissioners by the owners of the lands to be included in
the district. After hearings on the question, normally an election is
ordered on the question of whether the district is to be organized.
The districts are governed by a board of directors who are normally
elected by the taxpaying landowners.
Local improvement districts are granted such common and
municipal powers as eminent domain, the power to issue bonds, and
the power to levy special benefit assessment taxes.
Local improvement districts are public corporations. Their distinguishing characteristics are
(1) Independent corporate existence;
(2) Private benefit nature of the district;
(3) Liability for state, county and other public taxes;
(4) Limited public powers bestowed upon this class of districts,
particularly the power to levy special benefit assessment
taxes and eminent domain; and
(5) Territoriality.
The following districts appear to possess the characteristics of
public corporations as outlined above: conservancy districts for flood
control, 13 drainage districts, 4 voluntary drainage districts,' 5 soil conservation and soil erosion districts,' " internal improvement districts,' 7
and irrigation districts formed under the laws of 190518 and 1921.'9
Local improvement districts will be discussed further as public
corporations.
B. Special Service Districts:Quasi-MunicipalCorporations
Special service districts are full corporations, normally referred
to as bodies-corporate and politic. They are formed under general
enabling laws for the purpose of providing such normal governmental services as fire protection, sanitation, and hospitals to all of
'3 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
14 Id. §3 47-1-1 to -10-2.
15 Id.
§§ 47-9-1 to -2.
'1d. §§ 128-1-1 to-21.
17 Id. §§ 150-4-1 to -48.
1Id. §§ 150-1.1 to -60.

19 Id.

§3§ 150-2-1

to -40.

§§ 29-1-1 to-8-1 '(1963).
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the residents of the district. Special service districts are governed by
a board of directors which is usually elected by the resident electors
of the district but which is sometimes appointed by other public
bodies, such as the county commissioners, municipal governing
bodies, or the district courts.
Three general methods for forming special service districts are
found among the various enabling acts for special service districts.
First, organization of a district may be initiated by a petition of a
certain percentage of the taxpaying electors of the proposed district.
This petition is normally submitted to the district court or board of
county commissioners who hold hearings and then call for an election
to decide whether or not the district will be formed. Under some of
the statutes, however, if the petition is approved by the court or the
board of commissioners there will be no election unless a protesting
petition is presented demanding an election. A protesting petition
signed by a majority of the taxpaying electors of the district is sufficient under some of the statutes to have the petition for organization
dismissed. A second method of initiating the organization of a special
service district is by ordinance of a municipal governing body. Under
this method, the governing body of one municipality will pass an
ordinance calling for the creation of a district including several other
municipalities. The district will come into being upon certification
to the Secretary of State that a majority of the governing bodies of
the other municipalities named in the initiating ordinance approve of
the creation of the district including them. A third method of forming special service districts is the creation of a specific district directly
by the legislature. When the district is created by direct legislative
enactment, the taxpaying electors of the district are given the right
to protest its formation and cause its dissolution.
Special service districts are normally granted such public and
municipal powers as eminent domain, the power to issue municipal
bonds, and the power to levy ad valorem property taxes in addition
to special benefit assessment taxes.
Special service districts are quasi-municipal corporations. Their
distinguishing characteristics are
(1) Independent corporate existence;
(2) Public character as agencies of the state created for the
benefit of the inhabitants of the district and not only the
landowners; and, as a result,
(3) Power to levy general, ad valorem taxes, as well as special
assessments;
(4) Tax-exempt status as agencies of the state and quasi-municipal corporations; and, finally,

1968

LEGAL CLASSIFICATION

(5) Absence of the power of local government, which distinguishes quasi-municipal corporations from municipal corporations.
The following districts appear to possess the characteristics of
quasi-municipal corporations outlined above: domestic water works
districts,2" metropolitan districts, 21 water and sanitation districts,
fire protection districts, 23 metropolitan recreation districts,24 metropolitan water districts, 25 hospital districts, 26 metropolitan sewage disposal districts, 27 the metropolitan stadium district,28 mine drainage
30
districts, 29 and water conservancy districts.
Special service districts will be discussed further as quasi-municipal corporations.
C. Special Taxing Districts
Special taxing districts are districts which are organized "within
municipal limits, [and are] usually created and operated under the
supervision of the municipal governing body. ' 13' They can also be
organized for some purposes by counties within the boundaries of
the creating county. They are used for the purpose of constructing,
providing, or maintaining an improvement or service (e.g., curbs,
gutters, cemeteries, or waterworks) for the use or benefit of the
landowners or residents of the district.
Special taxing districts are not full corporate entities. Their legal
existence is almost indistinguishable from the parent city, town, or
county which created them. Usually they are created by a petition to
the municipal or county governing body which then, by ordinance
or resolution, creates the district. Sometimes the municipal or county
governing body acts as the board of directors for the district, while
at other times the board of directors is appointed by them. Usually
a separate budget is maintained for the district, although, in some
cases, surpluses from one special tax district can be used by another
special taxing district within the same creating unit. In some cases,
there is not a separate tax levy for the district, but funds are appro20

Id.§§ 89-1-1 to -31.
Id. §§ 89-3-1 to -33.
MId. §§ 89-5-1 to -49.

21

23Id. §§ 89-6-1 to -45.

§§ 89-12-1 to -35.
Id.§§ 89-13-1 to -15.
2Id.
§§ 89-14-1 to -16.
4

2 Id.
25

27

Id.§§ 89-15-1 to -47.
§§ 89-19-1 to -95 (Supp. 1967).

28Id.

2COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 92-28-1 to -26
30

(1963).

Id. §§ 150-5-1 to-50.

31 GOVERNOR'S LOCAL AFFAIRS STUDY COMMISSION,

supra note 2.
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priated to the district budget from the general budget of the creating body.
The distinguishing characteristics of the special taxing districts
are as follows:
(1) It is not a separate legal entity;
(2) It possesses only the power to levy special benefit assessment taxes through the creating body;
(3) It has a set of accounts separate from the creating body;
(4) It cannot exist outside of the boundaries of the creating
local government unit; and
(5) Control of district management lies in the creating authority.
The following districts appear to possess the characteristics of
special taxing districts: cemetery districts,"' special improvement disand towns, 4
tricts in cities and towns, 3 3 improvement districts in cities
5
and domestic waterworks districts - cities of 10,000.3
Special taxing districts are normally treated as administrative
subdivisions of municipal corporations proper and are mentioned
here for the sake of completeness. The law applicable to special
taxing districts will normally be found in standard texts on municipal
corporations. For this reason they shall not otherwise be dealt with
in this article.
D. Miscellaneous Districts
It was mentioned before that there were 29 enabling laws under
which special districts could be formed. So far, we have classified
and accounted for 22 of these. No classifications in law are airtight.
The following kinds of districts do not easily fit into the previously
discussed classifications.
1. Moffat-Type Districts
The following three districts have powers and limitations quite
distinct from other types of quasi-municipal corporations, but are
treated by the courts as quasi-municipal corporations.
The Moffat Tunnel Improvement District8 " was established in
the early 1920's. It was created to build a tunnel through the continental divide. The legislature directly created the district; however,
the owners of 50 percent or more of the property in the district were
given the opportunity to protest and reject its establishment. 37 In most
32 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
33 Id.

§§ 89-2-1 to -39.
34 Id. §§ 89-4-1 to -30.
35
1d. §§ 89-7-1 to -41.
3

61d. §§
7

93-1-1 to -23.

Id. § 93-1-3.

§§ 36-16-1 to -7 (1963).
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respects the Moffat Tunnel District is a public corporation. It is
based on the idea of special benefit to the property of the district,
and its sole taxing power is that of special benefit assessment taxes.
However, the district, in the first case testing its constitutionality and
validity, 8 was declared to be quasi-municipal in character, and thus
despite the public corporation character of its powers, benefits, and
purposes, it is judicially determined to be a quasi, or almost, municipal
corporation in its incidents. For this reason it is not taxed by the
state or other subdivisions of the state.8 9
Housing authorities4" and urban renewal authorities 4' appear
to be in the same position. In the case of People ex rel. Stokes v.
Newton4 2 the court held a housing authority to be a state agency
and quasi-municipal corporation, stating that it was in all material
respects similar to the Moffat Tunnel District.43 This holding was,
in spite of the facts, that unlike the Moffat Tunnel District and quasimunicipal corporations in general, a housing authority has no power
to levy any kind of taxes, either special assessment or ad valorem;
that the district is created by ordinance of city council; that the board
of directors is appointed and can be removed by the mayor of the city
with the approval of the city council; and that a housing authority
cannot exist outside of municipal limits. Urban renewal authorities
are similar in all material respects to housing authorities; even the
wording of the two acts is frequently identical. While no case was
found directly discussing the status of urban renewal authorities, it is
presumed that they would also be classed as quasi-municipal corporations by the courts.4 4
2. Special Drainage and Irrigation Districts
The Grand Junction Drainage District,4" and irrigation districts
organized under the Irrigation District Law of 1935,46 appear in most
respects to be quasi-municipal corporations. This is especially true
with regard to the power of each to levy ad valorem taxes. 47 How38

Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 72 Colo. 268, 211 P. 649 (1922).
Letter from Howard A. Latting, Chairman, Colorado Tax Commission, to Benjamin
Novak, December 2, 1966.
40 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 69-3-1 to -32 (1963).
39

§§ 139-62-1 to -14.
106 Colo. 61, 101 P.2d 21 (1940).
43Id.
at 67-68, 101 P.2d at 24.
"Because they do not possess the power to levy taxes, authorities are often classified
separately from special districts. R. SMITH, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, SPECIAL DISTIcTS
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 21 (1964). Since the Colorado Supreme Court did not
consider this a material distinction, these authorities are included with the Moffat
Tunnel District in this discussion of miscellaneous districts.
15 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-12-1 to -59 (1963).
46
id. §§ 150-3-1 to -88.
4 Grand Junction Drainage District, id. § 47-12-35; Irrigation District Law of 1935,
41 Id.
4

id.

§

150-3-35.
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ever, it is not clear from the cases whether these districts in the final
analysis shall be treated as public corporations or as quasi-municipal
corporations. Irrigation districts are not exempt from state and
4
county taxes.
3. Regional Conservation Districts
The two remaining districts to be accounted for are the Colorado
River Conservation District,49 and the Southwestern Water Conservation District." ° Each of these is directly created by the legislature
and given broad powers in the field of conservation. 1 It would be
difficult to draw a line determining whether these districts were
essentially administrative agencies of the state government, or
whether they were quasi-municipal in character. Subdistricts can be
formed under the two acts which resemble, in most material respects,
the special taxing districts discussed before.
II. PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

In Colorado, irrigation,5 2 drainage, 5" soil erosion," and probably conservancy districts for flood control 5 5 have been judicially
held to be "public corporations."
In its usual sense, the term "public corporations" refers to all
civil corporations which are not private,5" and includes municipal
corporations, quasi-municipal corporations, quasi-corporations, and
quasi-public corporations. 7 However, in applying the term "public
corporations" to the types of districts mentioned above, the Colorado
Supreme Court has not used it in its generic sense alone, but has
developed a narrower classificatory meaning indicating a particular
species of public corporations as well. A more orderly classification
scheme would have reserved the term "public corporations" to indi48

Letter from Howard Latting, supra note 39.

49 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 150-7-1 to -32 (1963).
5

Id. §§ 150-8-1 to -32.
51 Another district which would have been included in this classification had it not
been recently dissolved is the Caddoa Reservoir and Arkansas River Basin Conservancy District. Ch. 84, §§ 1-22, [1935] Colo. Laws 267 (repealed 1967) [was COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN.

§§ 150-6-1 to -19 (1963)].

52 See, e.g., Logan Irrigation Dist. v. Holt, 110 Colo. 253, 133 P.2d 530 (1943);
Holbrook Irrigation Dist. v. First State Bank, 84 Colo. 157, 268 P. 523 (1928).
53 Colorado Investment & Realty Co. v. Riverview Drainage Dist., 83 Colo. 468, 266
P. 501 (1928).
54People ex rel. Cheyenne Soil Erosion Dist. v. Parker, 118 Colo. 13, 192 P.2d 417
(1948).
55
The case of People ex rel. Setters v. Lee, 72 Colo. 598, 213 P. 583 (1923), does not
unambiguously classify conservancy districts for flood control formed under COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 29 (1963). The case speaks of the district as a "quasi-municipal
corporation," a "public corporation" and a "municipal corporation," and conservancy
districts are said to be "on the same footing as drainage districts." Because its
purposes and powers seem to be the same as drainage and irrigation districts in nearly
all material respects, it will be discussed here as a public or quasi-public corporation.
56 1 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 57 (perm. ed. rev. 1963).
57 18 C.j.S. Corporations § 18a (1939).
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cate the genus and would have referred to irrigation, drainage, and
soil erosion districts as quasi-public corporations, a more accurate
designation. However, the designation of both the general class and
the specific type appears to have become settled in the cases.", This
dual usage presents some confusion. From this point on, when the
term "public corporation" is used in its narrow, specific sense, it will
be followed (except in quotations) by the phrase "or quasi-public
corporation."
What then is a public or quasi-public corporation in the specific
sense? Outlined before were five characteristics which distinguished
local improvement districts as public corporations from other types
of districts and corporations. These were (1) independent corporate
existence; (2) the private benefit nature of the district; (3) liability
for state, county, and other public taxes; (4) the limited public
powers bestowed upon this class of districts; and (5) territoriality.
A. Independent Corporate Existence
Public or quasi-public corporations are unquestionably full and
independent corporate entities. They are usually denominated as a
"body corporate" 5 9 or a "public body corporate.'"'" Normally they
possess the power to sue and be sued in their corporate name, have
perpetual existence, adopt a seal, incur debts, liabilities, and obligations, issue negotiable bonds, exercise the right of eminent domain,
and levy special benefit assessments on real property within the district.61 They possess a board of directors of from three to five persons
who are responsible to the landowners of the district, and who are
free from supervision of their activities by any other bodies except
the legislature or the courts as outlined in the enabling legislation.
These elements distinguish public or quasi-public corporations from
special taxing districts which usually can be sued only in the name of
the city, town, or county which created them and which usually do
not possess a separate board of directors, but rather have the city or
town council or county board of commissioners act as the special
taxing district board.
B. Private Nature
Fletcher, in his cyclopedic work on corporations, wrote:
Private corporations are those which are created for the immediate
benefit and advantage of individuals, and their franchises may be
58 Compare Logan Irrigation Dist. v. Holt, 110 Colo. 253, 258-59, 133 P.2d 530, 532
(1943), with People ex rel. Rogers v. Letford, 102 Colo. 284, 297, 79 P.2d 274, 281
(1938).
S9See, e.g., Conservancy Law of Colorado: Flood Control, CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-2-5(7) (1963).
60
See, e.g., Soil Conservation District, CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 128-1-6 (1963).
61 See. e.g., Conservancy Law of Colorado: Flood Control, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-2-5(7) (1963).
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considered as privileges conferred on a number of individuals, to be
exercised and enjoyed by them in the form of a corporation ....
The property of this kind of corporation and the profits arising from
the employment of their property 0and
the exercise of their fran2
chises, in fact, belong to individuals.

This description can be applied to public or quasi-public corporations
of the type under discussion just as accurately as to the ordinary
business corporation which Fletcher had in mind. For a public or
quasi-public corporation is one for the private benefit of landowners,
the value of whose land is increased by the improvement maintained
or operated by the district. This was clearly stated by the Colorado
court in the case of Colorado Investment and Realty Co. v. Riverview
Drainage District:63
The primary purpose of such districts is to benefit the owners of
the lands by making their lands productive, or more productive, as
the case may be . . . . The benefit to the public . . . though substantial, 64is incidental to the main purpose sought to be accomplished.

In Interstate Trust Co. v. Montezuma Valley IrrigationDistrict65
the following description of the nature of an irrigation district was
borrowed from a California case: 6 6
"The district, when formed, is a local organization to secure a local
benefit from the irrigation of lands from the same source of water
supply, and by the same system of works. It is, therefore, a charge
upon the lands benefited by a single local work or improvement,
and from which the state, or the public at large, derives no direct
benefit, 6but
only that reflex benefit which all local improvements
7
confer."

The purposes and activities of public or quasi-public corporations
must be distinguished from those general activities of governments
which are normally called proprietary and which assume the governmental mantle by reason of the demands that governments assume
those responsibilities." An example of this is a municipal water or

sewage system.

Public or quasi-public corporations, unlike quasi-

municipal corporations to be discussed below, do not have the governmental or proprietary activities of a local or state government. The
Supreme Court of Nevada made this distinction very clearly in the
case of State v. Lincoln Power District No. 1 69 where the court distinguished for purposes of taxation between irrigation districts as
62 1 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
6383 Colo. 468, 266 P. 501 (1928).
6Id.

§

58 (perm.

ed.

rev. 1963).

at 471, 266 P. at 502.

6566 Colo. 219, 181 P. 123 (1919).
66 City of San Diego v. Linda Vista

Irrigation Dist., 108 Cal. 189, 193, 41 P. 291, 292

(1895).
67 66 Colo. at 221, 181 P. at 124.
68

See generally In re Bonds of Orosi Pub. Util. Dist., 196 Cal. 43, 235 P. 1004 (1925).

6960 Nev. 401, 111 P.2d 528 (1941).
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public or quasi-public corporations and power districts as municipal
corporations. Citing the Colorado case of Holbrook Irrigation District v. First State Bank,70 the court said:
Irrigation districts are organized primarily to promote the
material prosperity of the few owning lands within their boundaries,
just as manufacturing plants are established to produce profits for
their stockholders, and are not organized for the discharge of
governmental functions in addition to, or in aid of, the usual governmental departments or agencies. Power districts ...are created for
the sole purpose of assisting the state in the performance of its
governmental function of7 1distributing heat, light and power among
its people without profit.
The consequences of this recognition of the fundamentally

private nature of public or quasi-public corporations can be seen in
the cases.
In the Riverview case, an action had been brought against a
drainage district for the return of wrongfully assessed taxes. The
lower court sustained a demurrer to the complaint based on the defense that, since there was no statute authorizing such suit, the district
was like a county or school district and could not be sued without its
consent. The supreme court reversed on finding that the essential
purposes of the district were to benefit the landowners and thus that
it could be sued as a private entity without the need of a special statute authorizing suit.
In Holbrook, an action was brought by an irrigation district to
obtain a decree that the district's bank deposit in an insolvent bank
should be paid by the state bank commissioner to the district because
moneys due the district from an insolvent bank have a preference
as moneys due to the sovereign. The court denied the decree, holding:
"While an irrigation district is a public corporation, we do not think
that it is in any true sense a branch or subdivision of the sovereignty.
Its purposes are chiefly private, and for the benefit of private land-

owners."

72

People ex rel. Cheyenne Soil Erosion District v. Parker7 3 was
a case involving two issues of relevance here. The first concerned
an amendment to the Soil Conservation Act which required a vote of
75 percent of the qualified landowners of the district for the adoption
of land use ordinances. The contention was that submitting the ordinances to a vote of all the landowners constituted a "referendum"
and thus came within the municipal referendum provisions of the
7084

Colo. 157, 268 P. 523 (1928).

7160 Nev. at 410, 111 P.2d at 532. Power districts in Nevada would appear to be

essentially the same as quasi-municipal districts in Colorado, to be discussed in text,
section III infra.
72 84 Colo. at 165, 268 P. at 526.
73 118 Colo. 13, 192 P.2d 417 (1948).
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constitution of Colorado which required only a majority vote."4
Looking to the essential nature of the district, the court held:
It is thoroughly settled that a district such as the one here involved,
is a public corporation, but not a city, town or municipality within
the meaning of the constitutional provision. The purposes of the
district, as expressly set forth in the act, are, as the trial court
expressly found, primarily of a private nature for the mutual benefit
of the landowners of the district. 75
It was also contended that the amendment was violative of the
constitution because it permitted corporations and nonresidents of
the district to vote upon the adoption of land use ordinances, instead
of limiting the election to legal voters.7 6 The Cheyenne court rejected
this contention in language which strikingly illustrated the private
nature of public or quasi-public corporations:
We have heretofore shown that the relator [the soil erosion
district] is a public corporation and not a municipal corporation.
The so-called election upon the question of adopting land use
ordinances is not an election within the constitutional provision,
but is more in the nature of an election held by the stockholders
of
77
a private corporation in the management of its affairs.
C.

Tax Liability

The cases reviewed above indicate that the private benefit nature
of public or quasi-public corporations is more than a theoretical distinction. It has been a material and often decisive factor in the cases.
But by far the most important consequence of this fact lies in the
area of tax liability. The landmark case in this area is Logan Irrigation District v. Holt.7 8 The Logan case was an action by an irrigation
district to restrain the county assessor from assessing taxes upon the
district's property. The property of the district had not previously
been assessed for tax purposes by the county. The fundamental issue
raised was the meaning of the constitutional grants of exemption
from taxation. The constitution of Colorado provides: "The property, real and personal, of the state, counties, cities, towns and other
74 CoLo. CONST. art. V, § 1.
75118 Colo. at is, 192 P.2d at 420.

76COLO. CONST.art. VII, §§ 1, 11.
77118 Colo. at 20, 192 P.2d at 421. It is worthwhile noting here that at the time the
Cheyenne decision was handed down, the statute provided that a violation of a land
use ordinance so adopted by the landowners was a misdemeanor. This was later
declared unconstitutional as an unauthorized delegation of power by the legislature
to the district to make laws, violations of which were punishable as crimes. Olinger
v. People, 140 Colo. 397, 344 P.2d 689 (1959). The Soil Conservation Districts act
was amended by the legislature in 1961 to provide for the bringing of a civil action
by the district to enforce the land use ordinances rather than a criminal action. CoLo.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 128-1-14 (1963). This brings the actual mechanics of the statute
more into line with language in the Cheyenne case which held that the land use
ordinances were more in the nature of bylaws or regulations of a private corporation
or association.
78 110 Colo. 253, 133 P.2d 530 (1943).
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municipal corporations and public libraries, shall be exempt from
taxation."979

Counsel for the district contended that "while an irrigation district is not strictly a municipal corporation, yet it is a quasi-municipal
corporation - that is, it partakes of the qualities of a municipal corporation" 8 0 and that it was intended to be included in the language
"other municipal corporations" as above.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the districts were not
tax exempt. In doing so the court cited a long line of cases holding
that an irrigation district is a "public corporation," and that, as such,
its power of taxation is limited to local or special assessment taxes,
and that the purposes of irrigation districts, like drainage districts,
"are chiefly private, and for the benefit of private land owners."
It
concluded by quoting Cooley on Taxation to the effect that
"[ajn express exemption of property of 'municipal corporations'
applies only to municipal corporations proper and not to a corporation composed of shareholders [i.e., landowners] which in its form
and controlling features is a business enterprise upon which municipal powers have been incidentally conferred in promotion of its
primary purpose." 8 1

It is worth noting at this point the similarity of the reasoning in
this case and the Cheyenne case previously quoted. In both cases a
public corporation is compared to an ordinary business corporation
as to its essential purpose and controlling features.8 2
Counsel for the district argued alternatively that even if the
district did not qualify as a municipal or quasi-municipal corporation,
that it would still be exempt as an agency of the state. The court replied, quoting from Buffalo Rapids IrrigationDistrict v. Colleran:88
"It would seem that, in order to come within the rule which will
permit the court to consider the property of a public corporation
the property of the state for the purpose of exemption from taxation,
such corporation should be so closely engrafted upon the state
as to in fact exercise governmental8 4 functions and be supported,
directly or indirectly, by the state."
The court held that public or quasi-public corporations, such as
irrigation and drainage districts, were not agencies of the state despite
the fact that the irrigation district act "was adopted from California,
and the decisions of that state have held that irrigation districts are
agencies of the state, and their property.., exempt from taxation .... "85 The California courts have reasoned that while irrigation
78CoLo. CONST. art. X, § 4 (emphasis added).
80 110 Colo. at 258, 133 P.2d at 532.
81 1d. at 259, 133 P.2d at 532-33.
82 See text accompanying note 77 sut'ra.
83 S85 Mont. 466, 477, 279 P. 369, 372 (1929).
84
Logan Irrigation Dist. v. Holt, 110 Colo. 253, 259, 133 P.2d 530, 533 (1943).
851d. at 260, 133 P.2d at 533.
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and drainage districts are not municipal corporations in any true
sense, they are nevertheless public agencies, and under the theory
that their property is in effect property of the state they are not
subject to taxation. 6
The Colorado Tax Commission uses the following criterion of
taxability of special districts: "Exemption applies to municipal corporations usually performing a function or service, as contrasted with
districts that performed a special benefit to property and are collecting benefits the properties derived." 87
Referring back to the identifying characteristics of a public corporation, it may be recalled that one of them was the limitation of
their taxing powers to special benefit assessment taxes only. This
follows closely the criterion of the Tax Commission in that benefits
to properties derived from improvements could only be collected
through special benefit assessments.
It might be noted here that drainage districts and voluntary
drainage districts, to which the same provision applies, and the
Grand Junction Drainage District as well as the Moffat Tunnel
Improvement District and others, all have a special statutory exemption clause which exempts all the property, real and personal, of the
districts from taxes of the state, counties or other political subdivisions
of the state. 88 In the absence of this statutory exemption, it is
presumed that drainage districts formed under these acts would be
liable for taxes as public or quasi-public corporations. The Moffat
Tunnel Improvement District would probably remain tax exempt as
a quasi-municipal corporation.
D. Public Powers of Public Corporations
As has been shown, irrigation, drainage, soil erosion, soil conservation, and other local improvement districts are of an essentially
private nature. Why, then, are they treated and classified as public
corporations? The United States Supreme Court, in the landmark case
of Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,89 which upheld the constitutionality of the California irrigation district act (the Wright
Act) - from which the Colorado act was largely taken - described
the basis and necessity of granting to irrigation districts public powers
and a certain public nature. Applying the same reasoning the Court
86
87
88

Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. White, 186 Cal. 183, 198 P. 1060 (192 1).
Letter from Howard A. Latting, Chairman, Colorado Tax Commission, to Benjamin
Novak, Dec. 2, 1966.
Drainage and voluntary drainage districts, COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47-2-7 (1963);
Grand Junction Drainage Dist., id. § 47-12-27; Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist.,
id. § 93-1-12.

89 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
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had used with reference to reclamation districts,90 and pointing to the
essential similarity between these and irrigation districts, the Court
said:
If it be essential or material for the prosperity of the community,
and if the improvement be one in which all the landowners have to
a certain extent a common interest, and the improvement cannot be
accomplished without the concurrence of all or nearly all of such
owners by reason of the peculiar natural condition of the tract
sought to be reclaimed, then such reclamation may be made and the
land rendered useful to all and at their joint expense. In such case
the absolute right of each individual owner of land must yield to a
certain extent or be modified by corresponding rights on the part of
other owners for what is declared upon the whole to be for the
public benefit. 9 1

1. Power to Levy Special Benefit Assessments
The most important power granted to a public or quasi-public
corporation is the power to tax.9 2 But this power is limited, both in
purpose and in scope. In the following statement by the Colorado
Supreme Court the importance of the purpose of the tax, and the
private benefit nature of the public or quasi-public corporation can
be seen:
Irrigation district assessments are distinguished from taxes
levied by a municipality for water works, and taxes levied for
maintenance of schools, because of the public nature of the latter.
In the latter cases there is a direct public benefit, general in character,
for which the public at large, through general taxes levied for that
purpose, must pay. But in the construction and maintenance of an
irrigation system, there is obviously no direct general benefit. The
direct advantage is to the particular landowner whose land is
supplied with water, and he pays in proportion 93
to the benefits
received, the land itself being held for such payment.

This statement discloses much about the power of public or
quasi-public corporations to tax. First, the tax is an assessment for
benefits, based on the theory of apportionment of benefits and costs
111 U.S. 701 (1884).
164 U.S. at 163.
92 Technically, public or quasi-public corporations do not possess the power to tax, but
only the power to levy assessments. The distinction was made in the case of City
and County of Denver v. Tihen, where the court said, "Taxation and assessment are
not synonymous terms. Each is a separate and distinct exercise of the sovereign power
to tax but .. .taxation . . .is that burden or charge upon all property laid for raising
revenue for general public purposes in defraying the expense of government. Assessments are local and resorted to for making local improvements on the theory that
the property affected is increased in value at least to the amount of the levy."
77 Colo. 212, 215, 235 P. 777, 779 (1925). The U.S. Supreme Court commented,
"Although there is a marked distinction between an assessment for a local improvement and the levy of a general tax, yet the former is still the exercise of the same
power as the latter, both having their source in the sovereign power of taxation."
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 176 (1896). The power of public
or quasi-public corporations to levy assessments for benefits shall be discussed as an
exercise of the power to tax in this latter sense.
93 Interstate Trust Co. v. Montezuma Valley Irrigation Dist., 66 Colo. 219, 223-24,
181 P. 123, 124-25 (1919).
90 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist.,
91
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as a result of the improvement constructed, operated or maintained. 4
This was explained in People ex rel. Rogers v. Letford:95
As a general proposition special assessments are permitted by
authorized governmental agencies upon the theory that the property
against which they are levied derives some peculiar benefit by
reason of the projected improvement different from that enjoyed
by other property in the community in which the improvement
is to be made.9 6
Second, because of its less than general purpose, and the private
nature of its benefits, a public or quasi-public corporation does not
have the power to levy ad valorem taxes upon the general inhabitants
of the district, but is instead limited to special assessment levies
against the increased value of the land as a result of the improvement. 7 It might be noted, however, that while public or quasi-public
corporations, in the specific sense in which they have been discussed,
are limited to only special benefit assessment taxes because of the
private nature of the benefits, other public corporations, in the
generic sense, including municipal corporations proper and quasimunicipal corporations, are not precluded from this type of taxation
in addition to the power to levy general ad valorem taxes. 8
Flowing from the nature of a special assessment tax are two
restrictions upon its levy. First, the taxpayer has a right to voice
objection at a public hearing as to the amount of benefits with which
his property is charged and against which taxes are assessed.9 Any
act which attempts to delegate the special assessment taxing power
to a district without providing for hearings will be declared unconstitutional.' 0 Second, cumulative levies of special assessment taxes
to discharge delinquencies of local improvement taxes are unconstitu94Ruberoid Co. v. North Pecos Water & Sanitation Dist., 158 Colo. 498, 500, 408
P.2d 436, 437 (1965); Gordon v. Wheatridge Water Dist., 107 Colo. 128, 136,
109 P.2d 899, 903 (1941).
95 102 Colo. 284, 79 P.2d 274 (1938).
96Id. at 304, 79 P.2d at 284.
9 Ruberoid Co. v.North Pecos Water & Sanitation Dist., 158 Colo. 498, 408 P.2d 436
(1965) ;People ex rel. Rogers v.Letford, 102 Colo. 284, 79 P.2d 274 (1938).
98 See cases cited note 97 supra. See also Montgomery v. City & County of Denver,
102 Colo. 427, 80 P.2d 434 (1938) ; City & County of Denver v. Tihen, 77 Colo. 212,
235 P. 777 (1925).
9 "In Colorado, where the cost of a local improvement is to be paid by special tax or
assessment, the taxpayer has a right to be heard, after notice, upon the question of
benefits and the proportion of the general cost which may be assessed against him
... " Gordon v. Wheatridge Water Dist., 107 Colo. 128, 136, 109 P.2d 899, 903
(1941) ; accord, Embree v. Kansas City & Liberty Boulevard Road Dist., 240 U.S.
242 (1916).
199 Gordon v. Wheatridge Water Dist., 107 Colo. 128, 109 P.2d 899 (1941). There is,
however, an exception to this rule. Where the legislature directly determines the
boundaries of the district and declares that all of the property in the district is
benefited, the declaration of the legislature, while not conclusive on the courts, is
held to be "highly persuasive, and to be rejected only in case it is palpably false."
Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 72 Colo. 268, 279, 211 P. 649, 654
(1922).
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tional. 1° ' This is merely logical; if assessments are for benefits to
each piece of property, property A should not be additionally assessed
to make up for a deficiency in district income caused by the failure
of B to pay its taxes.
2. Eminent Domain

All of those kinds of districts which have been here classed as
public or quasi-public corporations possess the power of eminent
domain. However, this would not in itself grant any public character
to the district. For the power of eminent domain has, on occasion,
been granted to corporations which only by a great stretch of imagination could be considered public or municipal corporations. In these
cases the question is not whether the corporation per se is to be considered a public corporation, but whether or not the public power
granted (i.e., eminent domain) will be exercised for a specific public
use. The often cited case of Tanner v. Treasury Tunnel, Mining and

Reduction Co.1" 2 is a good example. In that case the issue was
whether or not a private company authorized for the purpose of
constructing a tunnel could acquire the necessary real estate under
eminent domain where the tunnel was to be used for draining mines
and for the transportation of waste and ore for such proprietors as
might wish to avail themselves of this facility. "The vital question
is, whether or not the use of the property sought to be condemned
will be public in its nature." 103 The court faced the issue in this way:
As an aid in solving this question, we may consider the character
of the business in which the petitioner proposes to engage through
and by means of its tunnel. If this business is wholly for its benefit,
then the use of the property sought to be appropriated would be
private; while, on the other hand, if the business proposed to be
carried on by the petitioner through its tunnel is essentially for public
benefit and advantage, then the use would be public....
[W]e find, in examining the authorities, that, in determining
whether or not a use is public, the physical conditions of the country,
the needs of a community, the character of the benefit which a
projected improvement may confer upon a locality, and the necessities for such improvement in the development of the resources of
04
a state, are to be taken into consideration.1
This test and these considerations were applied to the grant of a
single public power for a single specific use. However, this power
granted to special districts is a general power at the general disposal
of the district board of directors. The courts, consequently, in viewing
the power, look not to the requirements or benefits of a single "pro101 Interstate Trust Co. v. Montezuma Valley Irrigation Dist., 66 Colo. 219, 225, 181
P. 123, 125 (1919).
102 35 Colo. 593, 83 P. 464 (1906).
103 Id. at 595, 83 P. at 465.
104 id. at 595-96, 83 P. at 465.
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jected improvement," but to the character and general purposes of
the district in applying the consideration set out above. The case of
Rothwell v. Coffin 10 5 indicated the scope of the grant of this power
to an irrigation district. That case was a proceeding against a district
judge to require him to appoint a board of commissioners to determine the necessity of the taking of the complainants' lands by eminent
domain. The landowners argued that the entire project for which
the land were being taken was infeasible, and even if it were feasible,
the taking of their lands was unnecessary to accomplish the projected
result. The court found that the irrigation district had the power
under statute to construct, maintain, and operate irrigation district
properties, and to acquire rights of way over the properties of others.
The court also found that the project involved here, relating to the
draining of ponds and the constructing of a drain ditch to protect
irrigation dikes, was within the purposes of the district. The court
then decided against the landowners, holding that it was solely within
the province of the district board of directors to determine the
feasibility of any project within their general purposes and powers
and, further, that the district did not have to show the necessity for
taking the particular lands in question, nor even whether the district
would ever make use of the property it sought to condemn, but
simply whether or not the property was being condemned for a
stated purpose which was authorized for the district.
The power of eminent domain, however, can only be exercised
for a public purpose. If, as has been shown, these local improvement
districts are of essentially private nature, how then can this power,
as well as that of special assessment taxes, be justified? These districts, though primarily for private benefit, are public corporations.
That is, their existence is beneficial to the public weal, and the
public powers granted to them are necessary to their effective existence. The Supreme Court of the United States in Fallbrook summed
up the answer to this question succinctly:
The use for which private property is to be taken must be a public
one, whether the taking be by the exercise of the right of eminent
domain or by that of taxation.... A private company or corporation
without the power to acquire the land in invitum would be of no
real benefit, and at any rate the cost of the undertaking would be so
greatly enhanced by the knowledge that the land must be acquired
by purchase, that it would be practically impossible to build the
works or obtain the water. Individual enterprise would be equally
ineffectual; no one owner would find it possible to construct and
maintain waterworks and canals any better than private corporations
or companies, and unless they had the power of eminent domain
they could accomplish nothing. If that power could be conferred
105

122 Colo. 140, 220 P.2d 1063 (1950).
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upon them it could only be upon the ground that the property they
took was to be taken for a public purpose. 10
E. Territoriality
This last quotation from the Fallbrookcase also suggests another
characteristic of local improvement districts as public or quasi-public
corporations which distinguishes them from private corporations.
This is the characteristic of territoriality which is common to all
special districts. Territoriality refers to the establishment of exact
geographical boundaries within which the district will perform its
functions. Territoriality is necessary to the district as an organizational device to (1) compel the inclusion for election purpose of all
the landowners whose lands will be benefited by the improvement;
(2) define those lands against which special assessments may be
levied; and (3) specify the boundaries within which, or in reference
to which, the power of eminent domain may be exercised.
The characteristic of territoriality is part of the public nature of
a public or quasi-public corporation. It is believed that this characteristic has often led courts to refer to special districts as municipal corporations.1 °7 McQuillin listed "[a]population and prescribed area
within which the ... corporate functions are exercised" as one of the
10 8
six elements necessary to constitute a municipal corporation proper.
Banks speaks of it this way:
A municipal corporation generally has jurisdiction only in the territory embraced within its corporate limits. It therefore follows that
every municipality must have its boundaries fixed, definite and
certain in order that they may be identified and so all will know the
exact territory within the corporate limits. Such boundaries are
originally fixed when a municipality is incorporated and they may
be changed when territory is annexed or disconnected.' 0 9
This feature distinguishes a public or quasi-public corporation
from a private corporation which does not have set boundaries within
a state. First, this characteristic enables a public or quasi-public
corporation to include an individual's lands within the district
vhether the individual wants to be included or not, as long as the
formation procedures in the enabling act are followed. A purely
private corporation, on the other hand, is a collection of individuals
who each voluntarily join together for a common purpose. It is quite
possible for many of the member landowners of a public or quasipublic corporation to be quite bitterly opposed to the formation of
the district and the inclusion of them as members.
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161 (1896).
See, e.g., the use of the term "municipal corporations" as applied to irrigation districts
in People ex rel. Weisbrod v. Lockhard, 26 Colo. App. 439, 143 P. 273 (1914).
108 1 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORtATIONS § 2.07, at 454 (3d ed. 1949).
10 9
J. BANKS, COLORADO LAW OF CITIES AND COUNTIES § 4.1 (1966).
106
107
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Second, a private business corporation normally can operate
anywhere within the state under whose laws it is incorporated. A
public or quasi-public corporation, like quasi-municipal and municipal
corporations proper, cannot, of course, pick up and move to another
part of the state when conditions change. William Anderson made
this distinction clear when he listed the characteristics of territoriality
as one of the elements necessary to constitute "a government" for
the purposes of his 1941 enumeration of governments in the United
States." Discussing this aspect of a government further, he said:
Each unit of government ... operates over a definite land or landand-water area .... It may have incidental powers and possessions
beyond these territorial limits, yet it remains identified with a
particular area. In this respect it is unlike a business corporation...
which usually has a principal place or center of business such as a
central office, but ranges outward from that center without very
fixed territorial limits.",
Special service districts, which are discussed in the next section
of this article as quasi-municipal corporations, also possess this characteristic of territoriality.
F. Public Corporations- Conclusion
Thus we have the essence of a public or quasi-public corporation.
The legislature acts to enable the organization of an area and all of
its residents to accomplish works which, though they may privately
benefit those involved, redound to the benefit of the entire state.
Through bringing more lands into cultivation through drainage or
irrigation districts or protecting the economic base of the state
through flood control or conservation, the state as a whole is made
richer, and all of its people are indirectly benefited. For this reason,
several of the powers of the state are conferred upon private landowners organized according to statute, such as the powers of taxation
and eminent domain, the power to issue municipal bonds, and the
power to organize an area and all the landowners thereof into a district, even if a number of those to be organized might object. For
this reason, these districts, though essentially and directly for private
benefit, are classed as public corporations.
III.

QUASI-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

Districts formed under 11 special district enabling statutes were
classified above as quasi-municipal corporations.11 2 They were all
placed in the same classification because analysis of their provisions
reveals that they are similar in all material respects. Cases bearing
110 W. ANDERSON,
1I Id. at 8.
112

THE UNITS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1945).

See text, section IB supra.
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upon the quasi-municipal status of districts formed under each of
these statutes have not been before the courts. However, the Colorado Supreme Court has been consistent in classifying those which
have been litigated before that court as quasi-municipal corporations.
Thus metropolitan districts,1 1 water and sanitation districts," 4 and
water conservancy districts'" have been held to be quasi-municipal
corporations. In addition, metropolitan recreation and park districts," 6 and fire protection districts" 7 have been noted to belong to
the same classification, although there has been no specific holding
on these types of districts.
A. Independent Corporate Existence
Quasi-municipal corporations, like public or quasi-public corporations and unlike special taxing districts, are full and independent
corporate entities. Like all municipal corporations, they are not
managed or subject to the control of any other entity or body except
the legislature. They are usually denominated "quasi-municipal corporations" although in a minority of the enabling statutes they are
referred to as "municipal corporations." They possess the powers to
sue and be sued in their corporate name, to have perpetual existence,
to adopt a seal, incur debts, enter contracts, buy, sell, and own real
and personal property, hire employees, issue negotiable and general
obligation bonds, levy and collect taxes, and to exercise the power of
eminent domain. They are governed by a board of directors who are
normally elected by the resident taxpaying electors of the district and
are responsible to the inhabitants of the district without supervision
of their activities by any other bodies except the legislature or the
courts as outlined in the enabling legislation.
B. The Nature of Quasi-MunicipalCorporations
Throughout the preceding discussion of public or quasi-public
corporations, it was observed that they were basically private corporations in nature and benefits, upon which had been engrafted a few
of the attributes and powers of municipal corporations. On the other
113Garden Home Sanitation Dist. v. City and County of Denver, 116 Colo. 1, 177 P.2d
546 (1947); City of Aurora v. Aurora Sanitation Dist., 112 Co!o. 406, 149 P.2d
662 (1944). Both of these cases were decided prior to the enactment of the MetroSolitan Districts Act in 1947. However, the acts under which they were formed
ecame in large measure the provisions of the 1947 Act, which replaced them.
114Schlarb v. North Suburban Sanitation Dist., 144 Colo. 590, 357 P.2d 647 (1960);
Gordon v. Wheatridge Water Dist., 107 Colo. 128, 109 P.2d 899 (1941).
115People ex rel. Dunbar v. South Platte Water Conservancy Dist., 139 Colo. 503, 343
P.2d 812 (1959) ; Kistler v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 126 Colo.
11, 246 P.2d 616 (1952) ; People ex rel. Rogers v. Letford, 102 Colo. 284, 79 P.2d
274 (1938).

116 Burns v. District Court, 144 Colo. 259, 356 P.2d 245 (1960); Schlarb v. North
Suburban Sanitation Dist., 144 Colo. 590, 357 P.2d 647 (1960).
117 Schlarb v. North Suburban Sanitation Dist., 144 Colo. 590, 357 P.2d 647 (1960).
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hand, quasi-municipal corporations, as their name implies, approach
the opposite end of the scale. They are "almost" municipal corporations lacking only those powers of a municipal corporation which are
not essential to the fulfillment of their limited objectives or functions.
In traditional language, the basic distinction between quasimunicipal corporations and public or quasi-public corporations, respectively, is the difference between an organization for "normal"
governmental purposes and one which has as its purpose the organization of landowners to construct improvements that will affect the
value of their lands. Generally, Colorado municipalities are authorized to perform almost all of the functions (except, perhaps, water
conservancy) which are authorized for special service districts as
quasi-municipal corporations. The primary reason for the creation
of these latter districts has been to provide municipal services in
unincorporated areas where they were not available from a city or
town and which were beyond the county's power to provide. The
functions of public or quasi-public corporations as local improvement
districts are not "normal" governmental functions at either the county
level or the municipal level. They are, in fact, "extra-governmental."
The Supreme Court of Oregon has stated this more generally as the
first test of the corporate status of a special district:
The criteria adopted by the courts in determining whether a
specified public corporation is a municipal corporation designed to
confer general benefits, as distinguished from a special assessment
or a local improvement district designed to confer special benefits,
are, first, whether the functions which the corporation is designed
to perform are in their nature so interrelated with industry and
general community development as to affect the property as well as
the persons generally within the boundaries of the public corporation ....118
This character of a quasi-municipal corporation in Colorado was
clearly presented in People ex rel. Dunbar v. Proposed Toll Gate
Sanitation District."9 Referring to sanitation districts, 2 the Colorado Supreme Court said that they are "an expression of the unquestioned police power of the state in serving a public use for the 'health,
safety . . of the inhabitants of said districts.' "121 This concern for
all of the inhabitants of the district is greatly different from the
conception the courts have of public or quasi-public corporations
Petition of Board of Directors of Tillamook People's Util. Dist., 160 Ore. 530,
86 P.2d 460, 463 (1939) (emphasis added); accord, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Sacramento Municipal Util. Dist., 92 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1937). The other two tests
are whether the district was formed as a separate organization or is to be dissolved
upon performance of the special functions for which it was organized, and whether
it is empowered to levy a general tax or only to levy special assessments.
119128 Colo. 33, 261 P.2d 152 (1953).
120 Organized under COLO.REV. STAT.ANN.§§ 89-5-1 to -49 (1963).
121 People ex rel. Dunbar v. Proposed Toll Gate Sanitation Dist., 128 Colo. 33, 39,
118

261 P.2d 152, 155 (1953).
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which were "essentially private in nature," and primarily for the
benefit of those landowners of the district whose lands were increased
in value. This is the crux of the difference between public or quasipublic corporations and quasi-municipal corporations. In Ruberoid
Co. v. North Pecos Water and Sanitation District' this difference
was decisive. Ruberoid was an action by landowners to have their
lands excluded from the district on the grounds that their property
would not be benefited by being included in the district. Were this
a typical public or quasi-public corporation, this objection would be
sufficient to have them excluded. 1 3 But the court, quoting from Toll
Gate, distinguished these two types of districts: " 'Sanitation districts
...are not created for the purpose of improvements or benefits to
land, as may be the case in the organization of other kinds of districts,
but are for the inhabitants of the district' 124 and concluded: "We
hold, therefore, that lack of special benefit alone cannot be a ground
for excluding property from a water and sanitation district."125
Another distinction flows from the nature of the district. Requirements for voting in the district are different. In a public or
quasi-public corporation usually nonresidents of the district and corportions which own land can vote in district elections.12 6 In quasimunicipal corporations normally only persons who are registered
voters in state elections, have paid real or personal property taxes in
the last year, and reside in the district can vote.12 7 In public or quasipublic corporations, voting is often weighed according to the amount
of land a person owns in the district. In quasi-municipal corporations,
on the other hand, the principle of "one man, one vote" prevails.
";

C. Power of Taxation
Where the nature of the district most obviously makes a difference is in the more extensive power of taxation possessed by a quasimunicipal corporation. This was brought out most forcefully in the
landmark case of People ex rel. Rogers v. Letford 12 which upheld
the Water Conservancy Law of Colorado, 1 29 and held water conservancy districts to be quasi-municipal corporations. Water con158 Colo. 498, 408 P.2d 436 (1965).
See, e.g., Irrigation District Law of 1905, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150-1-3 (1963);
Internal Improvement District Law of 1923, id. §§ 150-4-12, -13.
124 158 Colo. at 501, 408 P.2d at 438.
1251d.
122
123

12 People ex rel. Cheyenne Soil Erosion Dist. v. Parker, 118 Colo. 13, 192 P.2d 417

(1948).
127 People ex rel. Dunbar v. Proposed Toll Gate Sanitation Dist., 128 Colo. 33, 261
P.2d 152 (1953).
12 102 Colo. 284, 79 P.2d 274 (1938).
9

12 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 150-5-1 to -50 (1963).

For a good presentation of the

important provisions of this act, and the Letford case upholding its constitutionality,
see Kelly, Water Conservancy Districts, 22 RocKy MT. L. REV. 432 (1950).
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servancy districts were granted the power to levy ad valorem taxes
as well as special benefit assessments.13 ° Discussing the constitutionality of the power to levy ad valorem taxes, the court quoted the
constitutional provision which authorizes the legislature to grant to
the corporate authorities of "any county, city, town or other municipal
corporation" the power to levy and collect taxes for all purposes of
such corporation,' and continued: "In this grant of power [i.e., the
power to levy ad valorem taxes] lies the distinction between a water
conservancy district under this act and ... irrigation districts ....

The public character of the water conservancy district is the occasion
I2
for this difference."' 3
The court held that a water conservancy district was a "quasi-

municipal corporation formed for a public state purpose," and had
the power to levy "an ad valorem tax based upon the same valuations
as all general taxes." ' 33 This type of district was quite carefully
distinguished from irrigation districts as examples of public or quasipublic corporations. It was stated that "an irrigation district operates
in a proprietary rather than a public capacity,' 13 4 and thus cases
limiting the power of irrigation districts to levy ad valorem taxes had
no applicability to water conservancy districts as quasi-municipal corporations. Three years later the court affirmed the reasoning in
Letford in deciding the constitutionality of the grant of the power to
levy ad valorem taxes to water districts:
Section 7 of the [Water and Sanitation District] act provides inter
alia that a district "shall be a governmental subdivision of the state
of Colorado and a body corporate, with all the powers of a public
or quasi-municipal corporation." If the district is such and no question is here raised on this point, the power to levy general taxes on
all property, real and personal, within the district may be conferred
by the legislature.' 85

In the case of Kistler v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District3 6 the court again distinguished between irrigation districts
as public or quasi-public corporations and water conservancy districts
as quasi-municipal corporations on the basis of the latter's purposes
30

1 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 150-5-16 (1963).
131 CoLo. CONST. art. X, § 7.

102 Colo. at 301, 79 P.2d at 283 (emphasis added).
302, 79 P.2d at 284.
134 Id. at 302, 79 P.2d at 283.
135 Gordon v. Wheatridge Water Dist., 107 Colo. 128, 136-37, 109 P.2d 899, 903 (1941).
As though to further emphasize the fact that quasi-municipal corporations exist to
benefit the inhabitants of the district generally and not only landowners, the water
district act in this case was declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it authorized
the district to levy an ad valorem tax on real estate solely, thereby exempting
personalty and violating the uniformity and exemption clauses of the Colorado
constitution.
132

133

Id. at

116 126 Colo. 11, 246 P.2d 616 (1952).
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and status as state agencies and their general taxing powers. The
court used these words:
The [water conservancy] district as here created is, according
our adjudication in the Letford case, supra, a state agency, and
such is a public corporation with broad powers to accomplish
objects which are of187public benefit, an advantage to the people
the state as a whole.

to
as
its
of

This is in striking contrast to an irrigation or other public or
quasi-public corporation which is "a local organization to secure a
local benefit," "from which the state, or the public at large, derives
no direct benefit."' 8 8 The Kistler court added:
It is technically characterized as a "quasi-municipal corporation,"
however, designed for state purposes. It is, by the broad grant of
power to levy taxes, distinguished
from the usual irrigation districts
authorized by Colorado statutes. 139

This distinction was summed up in the Ruberoid case, previously
mentioned, where the court said:
Unlike special [local] improvement districts, which do have as their
objective improvement of the respective properties and which are
financed by a special assessment on each by reason of the relationship
to the improvement bestowed, a water and sanitation district is
directly concerned with the public health and welfare. .

.

. Because

of that fact, the water and sanitation district does not depend on
special assessments for its revenue or taxing authority. Instead, there
is in the act . . . conferred upon the board "power and authority to
"..."140
levy and collect ad valorem taxes .

Another distinction between the extent of the taxing power of
a public or quasi-public corporation and a quasi-municipal corporation was made in the Letford case: Public or quasi-public corporations, which are given only the power to levy special benefit
assessment taxes, cannot collect cumulative levies to meet defaults
and deficiencies. 141 Speaking of public or quasi-public corporations

as local special improvement districts, the court met the objection
that cumulative levies of ad valorem taxes by a water conservancy
district were unconstitutional, saying:
It has very generally been held that such [cumulative] levies could
not be made for the purpose of paying deficiencies arising from a
nonpayment of taxes in local special improvement districts such as
irrigation and drainage districts....
These decisions are based upon the theory that the assessments
levied in a local special improvement district cannot exceed the
benefits conferred upon the property involved. The distinction
1371d. at
138

14. 246 P.2d at 618.
Interstate Trust Co. v. Montezuma Valley Irrigation Dist., 66 Colo. 219,
P. 123, 124 (1919).

139

126 Colo. at 14, 246 P.2d at 618.
Colo. 498, 500, 408 P.2d 436, 437 (1965).

140 158
141See

text accompanying note 101 supra.

221,

181
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between such a district and the one under consideration has been
2
heretofore pointed out .... [T]he objection is not tenable. 14

The point should be clear by now that two separate classes of
districts have been distinguished. One is for public purposes, the
other is not; one is a state agency, the other is not; one is to benefit
the public generally, the other is for the benefit of private landowners
only. And it should be clear by now that the presence or absence of
the power to levy general ad valorem taxes has frequently been used
by the court to determine whether a particular kind of district, such
as irrigation or water conservancy, is one or the other. For example,
no district has ever first been declared to be a public or quasi-public
corporation and consequently denied the power to levy general ad
valorem taxes. Rather, the presence or absence of this power has
first been noted, and the district then found to be either quasi43
municipal or public or quasi-public.
D. Tax Exemption
Quasi-municipal corporations are exempt from state and county
144
taxes. Three of the enabling statutes contain specific exemptions.
The remaining eight districts are exempt from taxes because of their
quasi-municipal status. In response to the question of what criterion
is used to determine whether or not a particular district is exempt
from taxation, the Colorado Tax Commission replied that municipal
corporations are exempt from state and county taxes under the Colorado constitution,'14 and added, "Examples of districts which are not
subject to local taxes would include fire, recreation, water, hospital,
sewer." 146 Three of these have been held by the courts to be quasimunicipal corporations. The others are similar in all material respects.
Thus, unlike public or quasi-public corporations, quasi-municipal corporations are exempt from local taxation without a special statutory
exemption. In this respect they are treated as municipal corporations.
A problem arises, however, as to the classification of irrigation
districts formed under the Irrigation District Act of 1935.147 Under
142 102 Colo. at 305-06, 79 P.2d at 285.

143 See Petition of Board of Directors of Tillamook People's Util. Dist., 160 Ore. 530,

86 P.2d 460 (1939); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Municipal Util. Dist.,
92 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1937). However, this logic has been criticized. See Brown,
People's Utility Districts in Oregon, 20 ORE. L. REV. 3 (1940). "[TIhe nature of
the taxing power would seem to result from the nature of the district rather than
the converse, since, if the agency is a municipal corporation, it may exercise a general
taxing power, but otherwise not." Id. at 10.
144 Grand Junction Drainage District, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-12-27 (1963)
Domestic Waterworks Districts, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-1-14 (1963)
Metropolitan Sewage Disposal Districts, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 89-15-42 (1963).
145 CoLo. CONST. art. X, § 4 (quoted at note 79 supra).
146 Letter from Howard A. Latting, Chairman, Colorado Tax Commission, to Benjamin
Novak, December 2, 1966.
147 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 150-3-1 to -88 (1963).
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this act irrigation districts are granted the power to levy general ad
valorem taxes. 1 48 If, as was stated above, the presence of this power
alters the nature of the district, changing it from a public or quasipublic corporation into a quasi-municipal corporation, could it not be
argued that they should be exempt from local taxes under the constitution? This argument has not yet been tested before the courts and
all irrigation districts are at present subject to taxation. Were this to
be litigated, the court would be presented with interesting alternatives.
If the court chose to remain consistent, it could either void the power
to levy ad valorem taxes, saying that an irrigation district was either
intended by the legislature to be, or is per se, primarily for the
benefit of the private landowners. Or it could decide that an irrigation district granted such power is quasi-municipal in nature and thus
falls under the constitutional exemption applicable to other quasimunicipal corporations. On the other hand, the court, by taking a
position inconsistent with its former decisions, could maintain both
the power and the tax liability of irrigation districts. However, it
would seem strange if an irrigation district possessing all the powers
of, say, a water district, were to be taxed by the state solely because it
supplied water for agricultural and rural uses rather than industrial
and urban uses. What the courts will do remains to be seen.
E. Quasi-MunicipalDistinguishedfrom Municipal Corporations

Quasi-municipal corporations have been distinguished from
public or quasi-public corporations on the basis of the greater public
powers and purposes accorded to the former. In many respects quasimunicipal corporations are indistinguishable from municipal corporations proper. In more than one case, districts which have been
classified here as quasi-municipal have been referred to as municipal
corporations proper. As regards tort liability quasi-municipal corporations are treated as municipal corporations.'
Authority to be
granted the power to levy general taxes as well as exemption from
taxation is derived from the "other municipal corporations" clauses
of article X, sections 4 and 7, respectively, of the Colorado constitution. Three of the 11 enabling acts under which these districts are
formed state that they either "shall be a municipal corporation" or
"shall have the powers of a municipal corporation."' 5 0 Why, then,
are these districts classified as "almost," or quasi-municipal corporations? And how are quasi-municipal corporations distinguished
from municipal corporations proper?
148

1./.§ 150-3-35.

149Cerise v. Fruitvale Water and Sanitation Dist., 153 Colo. 31, 384 P.2d 462 (1963).
15 Domestic Water\orks Districts, CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-1-11(1) (1963);
Metropolitan Stadium District, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-19-2 (Supp. 1967);
and Mine Drainage Districts, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 92-98-10 (1963).
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The majority of the enabling acts for these districts specifically
state that the districts formed under them shall be quasi-municipal
corporations. 1"' The wording of the Metropolitan Districts Act is
typical: "[T]he district shall be a governmental subdivision of the
State of Colorado and a body corporate with all the powers of a
public or quasi-municipal corporation."' 52 Commenting on this
clause, the Colorado Supreme Court, in the case of Aurora v. Aurora
Sanitation District,5 ' said:

The significance, as well as the definitive limitations, of the latter
legislative declaration, is made apparent when it is considered that
a quasi-municipal corporation is not a true municipal corporation

having powers of local government, but is merely a public agency
endowed with such of the attributes of a municipality as may be
5
necessary in the performance of its limited objective.1 4
This element of the "powers of local government," which the
court has denied to quasi-municipal corporations, is listed by McQuillin as one of the six elements necessary to constitute a municipal corporation in its strict and proper sense.' 5 What is meant by the term
"power of local government" was explained in the case of Stermer v.
Board of Commissioners.5 6

The court in Stermer held that the

primary purpose of a municipal corporation is the regulation of
conduct and the administration of its own internal affairs. Speaking
of a community with the power of local self-government, the court
said:
It is a community invested with peculiar functions for the benefit of
its own citizens. It possesses a local government of its own, with

executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It can enact and enforce
ordinances, having the force of laws, for the regulation of its
domestic concerns and the preservation of its peace.15 7

No quasi-municipal corporation in Colorado presently possesses
this kind of power. However, the history of police protection districts,
which until 1965 were enabled to be formed possessing substantial
powers of local government, should well illustrate the importance of
this distinction. The Metropolitan Districts Act of 1947 authorized
the formation of a number of different kinds of districts, either singly
151 Metropolitan Districts, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-3-8(7)

(1963); Water and
Sanitation Districts, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-5-7(7) (1963); Fire Protection
Districts, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89.6-7(7) (1963); Metropolitan Recreation
Districts, CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 89-12-7(6) (1963); Metropolitan Water
Districts, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-13-3 (1963); and Metropolitan Sewage
Disposal Districts, CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 89-15-6(2) (1963).
152 Metropolitan Districts, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-3-8(7) (1963).
153112 Colo. 406, 149 P.2d 662 (1944).
54 Id. at 411, 149 P.2d at 664.
1551 E.MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2.07 (3d ed. 1949).
156 5 Colo. App. 379, 38 P. 839 (1895).
157Id.at 388, 38 P. at 842 (emphasis added).

1968

LEGAL CLASSIFICATION

or in combination. One of these kinds was a "police protection district." Under the act, such districts were empowered:
(a) To license, tax, regulate, or prohibit hucksters, peddlers,
pawn brokers, billiard or pool halls, places of amusement, junk
dealers, and the transportation or storage of any dangerous or
inflammable liquids, gases or solids within the district.
(b) To establish and regulate a police force for the district
and to pass and enforce all necessary police regulations. Prosecution
for violation of any regulations of the district shall be handled by
the District Attorney ...in the same manner as ...provided by
law for the prosecution of misdemeanors ....
(d) To make, adopt, amend, extend, add to or carry out a
master plan for the physical development of the district .... [TJhe
board shall have all of the powers granted to the zoning commission
of any first class city ....158
No district was ever formed to provide for police protection
under this act, and consequently there are no cases testing its constitutionality before the courts. But in 1964 the Governor's Local
Affairs Study Commission leveled such deep criticism and raised such
doubts as to its constitutionality that the police protection provisions
of the Metropolitan Districts Act were repealed by the legislature the
following year.' 5 9 Among the criticisms aimed at these provisions
was the following comment:
[TJhe act apparently would permit the district directors to exercise
powers similar to the ordinance power exercised by municipal
governing bodies to determine offenses punishable by fine and
imprisonment. The central question presented is: Can the general
assembly constitutionally delegate to the governing bodies of quasimunicipal corporations legislative power to determine what is in
the interest of public health, welfare and safety? 1 6o
Under Aurora and Stermer the answer clearly would be no. For
with the power to enact police, zoning, and other ordinances having
the force of law, and the power to enforce them, these districts clearly
fell into the definition of municipal corporation given in Ster'mer;
and these powers would certainly qualify as the power of local government referred to in Aurora. Indeed, the Local Affairs Study
Commission referred to these districts as "Junior City Districts." 161
If districts could be granted these powers, any distinction between
cities and towns and such districts would be without a difference.
On the basis of the Aurora and Stermer decisions, taken together,
it is safe to say that no quasi-municipal corporation can be granted
the power of local self-government.
' Ch. 238 § 15, [1947) Colo. Laws 668-69 (repealed 1965).
159Ch. 218, § 2, [1965) Colo. Laws 866.
12O GOVERNOR'S LOCAL AFFAIRS STUDY COMM'N, ANALYSIS

OF THE 1947 METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS ACT - THE ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS, POWERS, AND PROBLEMS OF
METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS 8 (1964).

161 Id.

at 9.
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However, this does not mean that special districts cannot make
any regulations. Public or quasi-public and quasi-municipal corporations can, of course, make regulations which are administrative in
nature, relating to the local improvement or special service with
which they are charged. Further, referring to the Cheyenne decision
upholding the power of soil erosion and soil conservation districts
to enact "land use ordinances," where the regulations are in the nature
of bylaws of a private corporation, they will be upheld.
The Aurora decision, in which the negative definition of quasimunicipal corporations already mentioned was given, involved the
question of whether quasi-municipal corporations could exist within
the boundaries of municipal corporations proper. The City of Aurora
sought to enjoin the operations and nullify the existence of the
Aurora Sanitation District which lay wholly within the City's boundaries. The City argued the well-known principle, "There cannot be
at the same time, within the same territory, two distinct municipal
corporations, exercising the same powers, jurisdictions and privileges."' 6 2 The court held that the district was a quasi-municipal
corporation, and that the district and the City did not have the same
powers, and thus, although two municipal corporations could not
exist in the same territory, a municipal corporation and a quasimunicipal corporation did not conflict with each other. This principle was affirmed in a similar case three years later.6 38
There are other differences between quasi-municipal and municipal corporations. In 1936 the Colorado constitution was amended
to permit the legislature to impose an annual specific ownership tax
upon motor vehicles, trailers, et cetera, the proceeds to be distributed
"to the State and its political subdivisions" in lieu of all ad valorem
taxes upon property.' 64 In Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District v. Witwer. 65 the sole question to be decided was whether a
water conservancy district was one of the political subdivisions of
the state within the purview of the amendment to the constitution.
The court held that water conservancy districts, despite the holding
in the Letford case that they are "almost" municipal corporations,
were not subdivisions of the state in the same sense as counties, cities,
towns, and school districts, and thus could not claim any revenue
from the motor vehicle tax.
Besides the explicit distinctions and differences of the Aurora
and Witwer decisions, another distinction in the form of a limitation
162 City of Aurora v. Aurora Sanitation Dist., 112 Colo. 406, 410, 149 P.2d 662, 664
(1944).
10 Garden Home Sanitation Dist. v. City & County of Denver, 116 Colo. 1, 177 P.2d
546 (1947).
4
16 COLO. CONST. art. X, § 6.
165 108 Colo. 307, 116 P.2d 200 (1941).
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upon quasi-municipal corporations was implied in the case of Four
County Metropolitan Capital Improvement District v. Board of
Commissioners.6 ' M.C.I.D. was "a device for collecting a sales tax
on a region-wide basis, with the proceeds earmarked, by units of
1 67
government, for capital improvements and capital equipment."'
The district directors were given power to levy a 2 percent sales tax
to be collected in all of the municipalities of the metropolitan area
of Denver, to keep separate accounts for each unit of government in
the area in which the taxes were collected, and to purchase capital
equipment or construct capital improvements in accordance with the
desires of each of the units of government within the district, and
upon completion of the purchase or construction, to turn the equipment or improvement over to the unit of government from which the
sales tax was collected, and by whom it had been requested. The
district was declared unconstitutional on many grounds, the most
significant relating to its violation of the home rule provisions of the
Colorado constitution. But in elaborating upon its original opinion
in the case, the court, upon its denial of the petition for rehearing,
raised another objection which implies a further distinction between
municipal and quasi-municipal corporations. The court appeared to
limit constitutional validity of districts "which would increase the
value of real property proportionately to the value of the improvement": 16 8
So far as the pronouncements of this court are concerned our recognition has never been given to any departure from the basic concept

that an "improvement district" is geared to enhance the value of
property; that such districts are financed by ad valorem taxes, or
special assesments upon property; that the directors of such districts
function as administrators of funds derived from taxes on real
property the value of which has been enhanced by the "improve6 9

ment." '

This statement by the court is confusing. If the court was implying that because the word "improvement" appeared in the district's
title, that it was a local improvement district, and thus a public or
quasi-public corporation, then the court is correct in saying that the
district must be geared to enhance the value of property. But such
districts are not financed by ad valorem taxes. On the other hand,
if the district were a quasi-municipal corporation (the court nowhere
classified the M.C.I.D.), then, while it could levy ad valorem taxes,
166 149

Colo. 284, 369 P.2d 67, petition for rehearing denied, 149 Colo. 302, 369 P.2d

76 (1962).
1

67F. BRIDGE, IMIETRO-DENVER: MILE-HIGH GOVERNMENT
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1

Id. at 64.

169 149

Colo. at 304, 369 P.2d at 77.

63 (1963).
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its improvements or services need not be related to the value of
170
property.
This apparent dilemma may be solved by a different interpretation. In the next paragraph the court states: "A sales tax of 2%0 is
imposed throughout the district. Thus at the very outset we have a
significant departure from any district heretofore declared legal by
this court." 171 Perhaps what the court is trying to say here is that
quasi-municipal corporations, although they have been referred to as
state agencies, cannot be given the power to levy a sales tax, though
presumably this power might be given to municipal corporations
proper. It should be noted that although it is true that the court has
never passed upon the validity of a sales tax levied by a quasimunicipal corporation, the M.C.I.D. was not the first district authorized by the legislature to levy such a tax. Mine drainage districts
have been authorized by the legislature since 1911 to levy a limited
No other type of district is presently authorized to levy
sales tax.'
any kind of sales tax, but there would appear to be no constitutional
reason why such a power could not be authorized by the legislature.
F. Quasi-MunicipalCorporations- Conclusion
Quasi-municipal corporations constitute a unique class of special
districts, partaking of those characteristics and powers of a municipal
corporation which are necessary to perform their limited objective and
achieve their limited purposes, as defined in their enabling acts. They
have a legal nature all their own, and a function for which they are
molded in powers and purposes by the legislature and the courts to
provide for the needs of the citizens of the state. They establish a
continuum between public or quasi-public corporations as classed
herein and municipal corporations proper. It is hoped that this analysis will contribute to a better understanding and more effective use
of them in the State of Colorado and in other states to which the
same classificatory principles apply.

170 See

text accompanying notes 119-25 supra.

171 149 Colo. at 305, 369 P.2d at 77.
'2 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 92-28-19(5)

(1963).

